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Abstract 
 
We use the work-leisure choice model to compute equilibrium weekly hours worked 
for a number of Arab countries, where actual statistics are unavailable. We show that 
the labor supply curve is elastic in all Arab countries, and provide a new measure of 
labor productivity. This finding confirms previous research that workers respond to 
incentives, which has serious implications for tax and social security policies. We also 
provide some policy simulations pertinent to the effects of taxation on welfare and 
poverty. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
Our primary objective is to measure hours worked, which allows us to compute the 
Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and labor productivity in a number of Arab countries, 
for which no data have been published previously. The Frisch elasticity captures 
the elasticity of hours worked to the wage rate, given a constant marginal utility of 
wealth. Labor productivity is GDP per hours worked. We use the model to study the 
macroeconomic implications of some policy issues, such as the effect of taxes on 
welfare and poverty.  
 
To measure weekly hours-worked, we calibrate a theoretical model, namely, the 
work-leisure choice model, which Nickell (2003), Prescott (2004) and Shimer (2009) 
demonstrated its goodness of fit to G7 data.
1
 We use this model because the data of 
the main predicting factors (such as consumption, income, the tax rate and the share 
of capital) are available for the Arab countries.   
 
Our sample for the Arab countries includes two groups of countries: oil-producing 
and non-oil-producing countries. The former do not tax income and consumption. 
However, the average effective marginal tax rate crucially determines the solution of 
the work-leisure choice model, i.e., the supply of labor. To deal with this problem, we 
introduce natural resource endowment in the production function of the oil-producing 
countries. The inclusion of natural resources in the model creates a wedge between 
real wages and the marginal product of labor similar to the wedge that taxes create. 
The increase in the share of natural resource reduces hours worked. It discourages 
work and reduces labor supply. This is because the wage rate in the oil-producing 
countries exceeds the equilibrium wage rate due to rent.  
 
We make a number of contributions. First, we measure equilibrium hours worked for 
five Arab non-oil producers (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia) and for  
                                                 
1
 Prescott (2004) provides evidence that – everything else being constant – significant differences in 
international hours worked almost disappear when tax rates are similar. Scandinavians pay relatively 
higher taxes; Ragan (2006) and Rogerson (2007) argued that Scandinavian governments subsidize 
market inputs into home production and provide more transfers (e.g. subsidized daycare) to households 
that supply more labor. Olovsson (2009) uses home production data to account for the differences in 
hours worked between Scandinavians and others.  
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seven oil-producers. These are, Algeria plus the Gulf Cooperation Council countries – 
GCC –, which include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), for which the data on hours worked 
do not exist. Estimation of hours worked allows us to compute and analyze the Frisch 
elasticity of the labor supply, which has a major role in policy design. In addition, it 
allows us to measure productivity as GDP per hours worked in the Arab countries. 
Second, we are unaware of any published articles on the work-leisure model with a 
natural resource endowment. We modify the model and show that such endowment 
works just like a tax on labor supply. Third, a theory is valid if it fits different data at 
different times and places. So far, the bulk of the evidence for the work-leisure model 
relies on data from developed countries (the G7 and OECD). We confirm the validity 
of the work-leisure, intertemporal-intratemporal substitution model using data from 
the Arab countries. We show that Arab countries' labor supply curves are just like the 
G7 (also elastic), which has important policy implications. 1F
2
 People in non-oil-
producing Arab countries work long hours, but their relative productivities are low, 
therefore, they are relatively poorer. People in oil-producing countries work much 
less, which is consistent with Noland and Pack (2007), among others, who show that 
fewer individuals are involved in the production and creation of wealth. Fourth, we 
solve the model stochastically and produce baseline projections of future labor supply 
for the Arab countries. Then we conduct policy scenarios. For the GCC oil-producing 
countries, we ask how much welfare will change if they embark on a policy to 
diversify their income, i.e., reduce the reliance on oil as the main source of income. 
We find very significant increases in the lifetime consumption equivalent, which is 
our measure of welfare. We also ask how much welfare will change because of the 
introduction of a permanent consumption tax.  
 
Finally, we choose Morocco, which is a non-oil-producing country that has high 
poverty rate, and ask how long it will take to eliminate poverty if the government  
                                                 
2
 Lucas and Rapping (1969), Hall (1980), Andrew and Nickell (1982), Alogoskoufis (1987a, 1987b), 
Dutkowsky and Dunsky (1996), Nickell (2003), Prescott (2004), and Shimer (2009) among many 
others have provided evidence that support the model. Card (1991) cited a number of surveys at the 
micro level, which seem to suggest that the intertemporal substitution proposition offers little 
explanation to labor supply decisions. Heckman (1993) cited more supportive evidence. The literature 
is voluminous, but most cited work evidence against the intertemporal substitution model are Altonji 
(1982) and Mankiw, Rotemberg and Summers (1985). 
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reduces the effective marginal tax rate on households. We find that a small, 
permanent tax cut can reduce poverty by more than half in approximately 12 years.  
Section 2 summarizes the main features of the Arab economies, which have 
implications for the estimation of hours worked. We present the model in section 3. In 
section 4, we calibrate the model for the G7 countries and the Arab countries, estimate 
hours worked, compute the elasticity of labor supply, and labor productivity. Section 
5 includes policy simulations. Section 6 is a conclusion. 
 
2. A general description of the Arab economies 
 
The Arab countries are heterogeneous economies, where the economic growth rates 
exhibit high volatility and their productivity levels are low, Makdisi et al. (2006). 
Countries such as the Sudan, Yemen and Mauritania are classified as low-income 
poor countries, while other such as the GCC countries are classified as high-income 
due to oil exports. The remaining North African and Middle Eastern countries are 
considered to be middle-income countries. Low- and middle-income countries are 
mostly labor-abundant countries with high unemployment rates, especially among the 
youth and educated females. Labor income transfers from abroad (remittance) have a 
major role in financing final private expenditure, leading to a significant increase of 
the consumption ratio relative to GDP. The GCC countries, on the other hand, are 
labor-scarce and their economies are dependent on expatriate labor, which creates a 
deep segmentation in labor markets. The GCC countries are also small open 
economies that do not impose direct income taxes because of their large natural 
resource endowments. Because of the rents extracted from the sale of the natural 
resources, the huge net operating surplus pushes the capital ratio to a high level that is 
significantly different from the average ratio observed in regular production functions. 
Almost all Arab countries are welfare states, where the government provides health 
care, education and unemployment benefits. The public sectors are relatively large, 
and in many countries, they are the main providers of job. Productivity statistics are, 
therefore, very difficult to measure because the public sector’s output is hard to 
measure. Arab economies have low female participation rates.  
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However, in some GCC countries, the female participation ratio is high because of 
high wages in the public sector, and because the expatriate population is 
overwhelmingly active in the labor market. These structural economic features have 
significant impact on the average hours worked. In the GCC countries, hours are 
driven by the low tax rates, which tend to increase labor supply as is suggested by 
theory. However, large levels of rents tend to depress labor supply through inflating 
capital share and lowering the consumption ratio. These structural features of Arab 
economies seem to affect the labor supply. 
 
Noland and Pack (2007) argue that Arab oil-producing countries are characterized by 
the generation of large oil rents and boom and bust cycles driven by the world price of 
their export. They show that the shares of rent in government revenues and in GDP 
are relatively high. These shares are between 70 to 85 percent of government 
revenues, and between 25 to 36 percent of GDP. They conclude: “fewer individuals 
are involved in the production of wealth, and the majority of them are involved in its 
distribution and consumption.” 
 
Finally, the quality of the data of the Arab countries is poor. The data do not conform 
to international standards. In the model, which we present here, two variables play a 
major part in estimating hours worked: real GDP and real consumption. The National 
Income Accounts in the Arab countries are problematic in the sense that they do not 
use household expenditures surveys to measure consumption; rather it is computed as 
a residual from the national income identity. Real GDP is computed from the 
expenditures side, and it is not a chain measure. 
 
3. The Model 
 
We begin with the model, which is found in Prescott (2004), to derive the labor 
supply.
3
 A similar model is found in Nickell (2003) and Shimer (2009).  
                                                 
3
 Prescott cites a number of papers as the basis of this theory: business cycle literature of Cooley (1995) 
and Cooley and Ohanian (1999); in the depression literature, he cites Kehoe and Prescott (2002); in 
public finance, Christaino and Eichenbaum (1992), and Baxter and King (1993); and in the stock 
market literature McGrattan and Prescott (2003) and Boldrin, Christian and Fisher (2001). The labor 
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The model’s variables are lowercase. National Accounting Statistics are in uppercase. 
The utility function of a stand in household who faces a work-leisure decision is given 
by: 
 






 

0
)]100log([log
t
tt
t hcEU       (1) 
 
The utility function depends on the expected discounted sum of consumption c and 
leisure, where 100 is the number of hours available for individuals to work in a week 
and h is hours-worked in “market activities”. The expectations operator E does not 
necessarily mean rational expectations, and 10   is the discount factor and 
specifies the degree of patience. A high value means more patience for consumption 
and leisure. The parameter  is 0 and denotes the value of the non-market 
productive time per household. It could be the relative value of the time spent 
working at home. Typically, it is the relative value of leisure. The production using 
this time is untaxed. The utility function includes one consumption good as in 
Christaino and Eichenbaum (1992).  
 
The stock of capital evolves according to 
 
ttt xkk  )1(1  ,        (2) 
 
where k is the stock of capital and tx is gross investments. The depreciation rate is . 
 
There is a stand-in firm with a Cobb-Douglas, constant returns to scale, technology of 
production: 
 
  1tttt hkAy ttt gxc  ,        (3) 
 
where g is government expenditure. 
                                                                                                                                            
supply is consistent with Lucas and Rapping (1969), Lucas (1972), Kydland and Prescott (1982), 
Hansen (1985) and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). 
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Total factor productivity is exogenous and is given by tA 3F
4
 The parameter  is the 
share of capital; 10  . For our purpose, we assume that technical progress is 
exogenous because it has no role in the inference being drawn.  
 
The household’s date t  budget constraint is: 
 
ttttKtthtxtc Tkkrhwxc   ))(1(.)1()1()1( ,   (4) 
 
where w is the real wage, r is the real interest rate or rental capital, and T is transfer 
payment. The tax rates of consumption, investments, labor and capital are given by
with the subscripts c , x , h , k , which denote consumption, investments, hours 
worked and capital, respectively.  
 
We must emphasize the assumptions, as in Prescott (2004), that there is a government, 
which taxes consumption, investments, income from labor, etc., and the government 
budget constraint, which is unchanged in each period. All tax revenues, except those 
used to finance the pure public consumption good, are given back to the households 
either as transfer payments or in-kind. These transfers are lump sum, being 
independent of the household’s income. Most of the public expenditures are 
substitutes for private consumption in the G-7 countries.  
 
We see no reason for this not being the case in the Arab countries. In Prescott (2004), 
the substitution between public and private consumption is one-to-one, except for the 
military expenditures. The goods and services we are discussing here are typical: 
public education, health, etc. The assumption regarding the estimate of the pure public 
good g is twofold the military share’s of employment times GDP.5  
                                                 
4
  It is hard to model the evolution of technical progress itA in the Arab countries because of the lack of 
data. The stock of R&D and patents registered in the US are very low. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, 
Jordan, Kuwait and the UAE combined registered 367 patents in the US during the period from 1980 to 
2000. Compare that to Korea, which registered 6328 patents. In addition, human capital stock and its 
quality are poor; see Development Challenges for the Arab Region: A Human Development Approach, 
UN (2009).  
 
5
 Prescott (2004) uses one consumption good following Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). Rogerson 
(2003) finds that one consumption good is not a good assumption for explaining the aggregate labor 
8 
 
  
Clearly, this is a very simple tax system than in reality. Introducing a more realistic 
accelerated depreciation and investment tax credits would affect the price of the 
investment good relative to the consumption good, but it would not alter the inference 
drawn from this model. This is a simple macroeconomic model rather than a public 
finance model.  
 
There are many different ways to compute the tax rate.
6
 Prescott (2004) derives the 
tax rate in the model theoretically. He derives an aggregate effective marginal tax rate 
on labor income using both the tax rate on consumption c and on labor h . It is the 
fraction of additional labor income that is taken in the form of taxes, holding 
investments fixed.
7
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

1
         (5) 
 
Following Prescott (2004), it is important to note that the National Income Account is 
adjusted to fit with economic theory, where households pay the taxes. The major 
adjustment is to treat "indirect taxes less subsidy" as "net taxes on final product". It 
means "net indirect tax" is not a cost component of GDP. Indirect taxes include value-
added taxes, sales taxes, excise taxes, property taxes, etc., which are mostly levied on 
households.  
                                                                                                                                            
supply in Scandinavian countries, because Scandinavians spend more time working at home than 
others due to high income tax. 
 
6
 There is a literature on the methods of estimating average marginal income tax rates in the US, where 
differences seem significant. Differences in the computation of income tax rates could affect the tax 
rate  in model. For more on the debate, see Barro (1979), Seater (1982), Barro and Sahasakul (1983, 
1986), Stephenson (1998), and Akhand and Liu (2002).  
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Some indirect taxes such as diesel fuel taxes, property taxes on office buildings and 
sales taxes on equipments, etc. fall on all forms of products. It is assumed that two-
thirds of the indirect taxes less subsidy fall directly on private consumption 
expenditures, and the remaining one-third is distributed evenly over private 
consumption and private investment.  
 
Again, the National Accounting Statistics are in uppercase. The net indirect taxes on 
consumption, is: 
 
IT
IC
C
ITc ]3/13/2[

 ,        (6) 
 
where C is private consumption expenditures, I is private investment and IT is net 
indirect taxes. The model economy's consumption is cmil ITGGCc  , where G
is public consumption and milG is military spending. The model economy's output is 
given by ITGDPy  .
8
 
 
The consumption tax rate is: 
 
 
c
c
c
ITC
IT

 .         (7) 
 
Taxes on labor income are two: the income tax with a marginal tax rate, and a social 
security tax. The social security marginal tax rate
))(1(
sec
ITGDP
taxesuritysocial
ss



  , where 
the denominator is labor income if labor is paid its marginal productivity.  
 
The average income tax rate is 
 
                                                 
8
 In the Arab countries, public consumption is large, and so is the subsidy. In some Arab countries, 
only the total amount of subsidy is reported, which is the sum of production and consumption goods 
subsidy. Because of the large fuel subsidy, for example, the indirect tax rate is smaller than otherwise. 
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TaxesDirect
inc

 ,       (8) 
 
where direct taxes are paid by households and do not include corporate income taxes. 
Prescott's estimate of the marginal labor income tax 
incssh
t  6.1  and the number 
1.6 reflects the fact that the marginal income tax rates are higher than the average tax 
rates. This particular number (1.6) delivers a marginal income tax found in Feenberg 
and Coutts (1993) for the "U.S.". Their calculation of the marginal income tax is 
based on a representative sample of tax records.  
 
They calculate by how much the tax revenue increases if every household labor 
income is increased by one percent. The total change in tax receipts divided by the 
total change in labor income is their estimate of the marginal income tax. This 
assumption may not fit the Arab countries. For this reason, we use sensitivity analysis 
and report the figures in appendix 3. We recalibrated hours for values of 1.0, 1.6, 2.6 
and 3.6. We prefer the central estimates because we believe the estimates are neither 
very low nor very high, and the tax rates in the Arab countries cannot be higher than 
40 percent.  
 
From the above we get the FOC, then the marginal rate of substitution equal to the 
price ratios:5F 
 
t
t
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c
h
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)1/(


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        (9) 
 
And from the production function, the marginal product of labor is equal to the real 
wage rate: 
 
ttttt hyhkw /)1()1( 
         (10) 
 
The equilibrium labor supply is solved for from the two FOC above,  
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The ratio of consumption to GDP in equation (11) captures the intertemporal 
substitution. The tax rate in equation (11) captures the intratemporal substitution. If 
people expect the effective tax rate on labor income to be lower in the future, for 
example, they will increase their current consumption. It is important to note that our 
analysis of the labor supply abstracts from demographic factors, which are known to 
affects the supply of labor.  
 
There is a voluminous literature of microeconomic analysis of the supply of labor, 
which is more difficult to incorporate into this simple macroeconomic model. Cole 
and Ohanian (1999, 2002), Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2003), and Fisher and 
Hornstei (2002) produced evidence of other factors that affect labor supply decisions. 
This paper focuses on the effect of a smaller number of variables to get a reasonable 
measure for hours worked in the Arab countries, which are unavailable. We also have 
insufficient demographic data to incorporate in our analysis.  
 
3.1 Introducing natural resource endowment effect 
 
For the GCC countries and Algeria, the theory predicts that a low tax rate   increases 
hours worked. The GCC countries have a low tax rate. If we fit the model for the 
GCC, hours worked will be very high, greater than hours in the US and Japan, which 
is nonsensical. To ameliorate this problem, we modify the production function by 
introducing a natural resource (oil and gas) endowment.  
 
The production function becomes: 
 
  1ttttt hkNAy ,        (12) 
 
where tN could be the natural resource utilization rate, tR . Stiglitz (1974) focuses on 
the ratio of resource utilization to the stock of natural resources, i.e., SR / , while  
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Solow and Wan (1976) only use the flow.
9
 The budget constraint in equation (4) will 
include income per capita from natural resources on the RHS.  
 
)ˆ/())(1(.)1()1()1( tt
o
tttttKtthtxtc PNPTkkrhwxc   , (13) 
 
where o
t
P  is the international price of the natural resource, 
t
N  is the flow of natural 
resources, and 
t
Pˆ is population. 
 
Solving the model the same way gives: 
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h








1
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where the superscript N refers to natural resources. The share of hydrocarbon in 
output is . For  >0, this formula predicts that Nh in equation (14) is smaller than h
in equation (11). For  =1, Nh <0 and for =0, Nh is identical to h . For 0N
t
h , max
must be equal to 1 . 
 
4. Calibration 
 
Developing countries in general and the Arab countries specifically do not report data 
on actual hours worked. Thus, we cannot measure the goodness of the fit of the 
model. To shed light on the performance of the model we will calibrate the model for 
the G7 first because these countries report actual hours worked. We describe the G7 
data in the appendix 1 and the Arab countries data in appendix 2. Note that our data 
are measured in PPP term. To calibrate the model for countries, Ni ,2,1 , we fix 
the share of capital   to the average of its value over the sample.  
 
                                                 
9
    In any case, it is immaterial for our case whether we have tR  or  in the production function  
   because the share parameter   is what enters in the equilibrium solution of the hours worked. 
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The share of capital is measured from National Income Accounts, as gross operating 
surplus / GDP ratio. The ratio 
ii
yc / is also the average over the sample.  
 
The value of the effective marginal tax rate 
i
 also varies across countries. Since we 
compare our estimates of hours worked to those of the G7 countries, we follow 
Prescott (2004) and choose the parameter such that it maximizes the fit of the model 
(minimum error). However, for the Arab countries we choose arbitrarily, because 
we do not have actual data. The results are reported in table 1.The upper panel of table 
1 reports the calibration of the model’s equilibrium hours – worked for the G7 
countries, for data from 2000 to 2008.  
 
The model fits Canada, Italy and Japan best; slightly over-predicting in the case of 
Canada, and slightly under-predicting in the cases of Italy and Japan. On average, 
however, the fit is fine with an error of 0.06. The G7’s average of weekly hours 
worked per person is about 23. 
 
The fit can be made tighter when we allow   to vary across countries. We do not 
report these results, but allowing  to vary across the G7 countries shows that for 
Italy, the model has a value of equal to the average of 1.78. Three countries Canada, 
UK and the US have a value of  equal 1.6, which is below the G7 average. The non-
English speaking countries France, Germany and Japan have a value of  higher than 
2. These estimates of indicate that the relative value of leisure is much higher in the 
non-English speaking G7 countries. 
 
Now we can turn to estimating hours worked for the Arab non-oil producing. Those 
are also labor-abundant countries. We have data from 1991 to 2006. We compute the 
effective marginal tax rate. Note that there are no time series data for the marginal tax 
rates for Arab countries. Since our results will depend on our assumptions about 
certain parameters in the model, we conduct a sensitivity analysis.  
 
From the National Income Account for each country, we calculate the share of capital 
as gross operating surplus to GDP.  
14 
 
  
The average value of   is similar across Arab countries. Thus, we fix the share of 
capital,  to the average, which is 0.48. Moreover, we try of 1.78, which is the same 
as average G7 value.
10
 Note that we do not have data or estimates for  in other non-
G7 or OECD countries such as the Asian countries. We let 
ii
yc / to differ across 
countries. We use the average of 
ii
yc / over the sample. We do the same with the 
effective marginal tax rate. The lower panel of table 1 reports the results of 
i
h for the 
non-oil-producing Arab countries.  
 
These estimates seem sensible relative to the G7. The average of the weekly hours 
worked per person is 19.87, which is lower than the G7 average of 23.4. Beginning 
with the most obvious, the Syrians work much more than all other countries (26.1 
hours) because they have the lowest tax rate among Arabs, and their yc / ratio is less 
than average of the G7 countries. Egypt's estimate of hours worked is less than 
Jordan's despite the fact that the Jordon has a higher tax rate. This is because the 
consumption-output ratios are quite different. The Egyptians’ yc / ratio is 0.98 while 
that of Jordan is 0.79. Egypt's yc /  ratio significantly exceeds the G7 average.  
 
All Arab non-oil-producing countries have a high consumption to output ratio, far 
exceeding the developed countries in PPP terms. The North African nations, Tunisia 
and Morocco, work less than the Syrians and the Jordanians because they pay 
relatively higher taxes. Both Morocco and Tunisia have average weekly hours worked 
of approximately 17.  
 
The results in table 1 confirm the literature's findings that when people are taxed the 
same rate they, they most probably supply the same amount of labor. Taxes affect 
labor supply decisions in the Arab countries.  
 
Our estimates of the Frisch elasticity in table 1 suggest that the labor supply curves 
for the Arab countries are elastic, particularly in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. These 
results are consistent with the literature.  
                                                 
10
  One could easily allow these parameters to change across countries, but we fix them because we are 
comparing hours in the Arab countries to the G7 hours, which are the yardstick for the fit of the model.   
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Prescott (2004) argues that elastic labor supplies spares countries the trouble of facing 
the choice of either increasing taxes on the young, thereby reducing their welfare, or 
not honoring the promise made to the old to avoid making them worse off. One policy 
implication for large labor supply elasticity is that as the population ages, promises of 
payment to the current and future old people do not necessarily have to be financed by 
increasing taxes. 
 
Our estimates of the labor supply can explain why the non-oil-producing Arab 
countries have low productivity. Table 2 reports the decomposition of income per 
working age population relative to the average G7. We decompose GDP per working 
age population into GDP per hour and hours per working age population, i.e., labor 
productivity multiplied by labor utilization. The Arab non-oil producing countries do 
not seem to have problems with labor utilization. They work long hours, but their 
relative productivity level is significantly lower than the G7. The Arabs work 
relatively long hours, produce relatively less output per hour and they are poorer than 
the G7 countries. These results are sensible and hardly surprising. This model predicts 
that any increase in the tax rate in the Arab non-oil-producing countries will make 
them even poorer.  
 
Now we turn to the oil-producing Arab countries. They also have labor shortages. The 
majority of the labor force is imported. These countries include the GCC countries 
plus Algeria. We have data from 1991 to 2003. The GCC’s effective marginal tax rate 
is relatively very low, about 5 per cent. It represents social security tax. The GCC 
countries do not have income and consumption taxes. Algeria differs from the GCC in 
taxation. Algeria’s effective marginal tax rate is 34 per cent.  
 
We estimate hours-worked over two samples. The first sample is during the periods 
when the price of oil was low; hence, oil revenues to GDP were low. The second 
sample is when the price of oil was high; hence, the revenues to GDP were high. The 
share of hydrocarbon in GDP is from each country’s budgets.  
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It is the ratio of oil and gas revenues to GDP, )/( nonooooo qpqpqp  , where the 
superscript o denotes hydrocarbon (oil and gas), hence op is the price of the 
hydrocarbons and oq is the quantity. The superscript no denotes the non-hydrocarbon 
revenue. 
 
Results of the estimates of hours worked for the GCC and Algeria are shown in table 
3. For sensitivity analysis, we use values of   1.3, 1.5 and 2.0. The average predicted 
equilibrium weekly hours worked in the GCC is between a high of approximately 20 
hours and a low of 13, during the sample when oil revenues as a share of GDP were 
low. This is a sensible range compared with previous estimates of the G7, and Arab 
non-oil-producing countries. This average is lower than the average of the non-oil-
producing Arab countries. Algerians work slightly longer hours than the average 
GCC, but less than Bahrain. Bahrain, Oman and the UAE predicted weekly hours 
worked exceed the average GCC. They also work longer hours than the average Arab 
countries do. Bahrain and Oman in particular implement active labor market policies 
to reduce unemployment and to encourage their citizens to work. Kuwait, Qatar and 
Saudi Arabia work relatively fewer hours than all other Arab countries.  
 
Hours worked plummet in the second sample over the period of high hydrocarbon 
revenues. The average of hours worked falls, between 5 and 7 hours. For Algeria, it 
falls between 5 and 7 hours.  Among the GCC, Oman's hours-worked decline is the 
largest, between 8 and 12 hours. On average, GCC’s hours worked could decline to 
nearly 8 hours a week due to higher hydrocarbon revenues. This says a lot about the 
extent of the rent in these economies and reflects the manifestation of the oil curse in 
the labor market. In the leisure – work model, leisure is a normal good. As income 
increases, the income effect induces workers to buy more leisure, hence less work. 
 
5. Two policy simulation experiments 
5.1. Diversification, consumption tax, and welfare in GCC 
 
We provide a baseline, stochastic projection for hours worked until 2050. We choose 
2050 arbitrarily to indicate the long run. Then we simulate policy scenarios.  
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The first policy scenario is about the welfare effect of taxes. The GCC countries have 
been discussing ways to diversify their income source, away from oil, for some time. 
Here, we assume that the GCC governments pursue policies to diversify the sources of 
income, i.e., relies less on oil. We study the effect of a reduction in the share of oil in 
GDP in the.  
 
We examine the effect of a permanent reduction in the share of hydrocarbon in GDP, 
 , by an amount equal to 0.25 standard deviations. We assume that the GCC countries 
have successfully managed to diversify their economies away from hydrocarbon by the 
year 2020, leading to a permanent reduction in the share of oil and gas in GDP from the 
year 2021 to 2050 (the end of our simulation).  The share of oil and gas revenues, as we 
stated earlier, is )/( nonooooo qpqpqp  . Diversification is taken to mean a 
reduction in the value of   coming through an increase in nonoqp  (the non-
hydrocarbon output), leading to a higher share of labor in the production function and a 
lower share of natural resources. The increase in labor supply increases output and 
consumption. We measure the welfare effect of the policy by the lifetime consumption 
equivalent, which is the change in real consumption required to make the households 
indifferent to the policy.  
 
We solve the model numerically over the period 2004 to 2050 using stochastic 
simulation with 10000 iterations.
11
 We set the parameters 2 and 51.0 , which 
are the average values for the GCC over the sample 1991-2003.  
 
We assume that the parameter  evolves as a random walk over the forecasting period; 
the error term has a mean of zero and a standard deviation equal to the sample value.  
 
 
                                                 
11
 When solving, an approximated Jacobian is used when linearizing the model. Then the 
approximation is updated each iteration by comparing the residuals, which result from the new trial 
value of the endogenous variables with the residuals of the linear equation. The method is not 
significantly different from Newton, but it runs faster. The innovations to stochastic equations are 
generated by drawing a set of random numbers from a standard normal distribution each period. These 
draws are scaled to match the variance-covariance system by multiplying the vector by its standard 
deviation because the covariance matrix is diagonal.  
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To simplify the solution of the model further, we appeal to the stochastic implications 
of the lifecycle-permanent income theory of consumption, and assume that the 
conditional expectations of the future marginal utility of consumption follow a random 
walk (Hall, 1978). Working age population grows at historical trend. We assume that 
the starting value of the capital stock is twice as large as real GDP in 1960. We fix the 
depreciation rate at 0.05. The value of the exogenous technical change A in the 
production function is the constant term; we calibrate it such that the value of output in 
2004 is not far away from 2003 in order to ensure we have a sensible projection. 
 
The baseline level of consumption is increasing in all GCC countries, but leveling off in 
the far future. The consumption to output ratio projection depends on the projected 
level of output from the production function. In the baseline solution, Bahrain's ratio 
has a negative trend suggesting that output is projected to increase by more than 
consumption. This ratio rises in Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia. The most significant 
positive trend is in Saudi Arabia. The ratio is constant in the UAE.  
 
There has been a lot of discussion about introducing consumption tax in the GCC. 
Thus, our second policy simulation studies the effects of introducing a 5 percent 
permanent value added tax (VAT). A consumption tax c in the GCC on welfare, 
translates to a 9.5% increase in the tax rate  (equation 5). We re-solve the model again 
under this assumption.  
 
The results of the two policy simulations are reported in table 4, which has 14 columns 
with the countries listed in the first column. We report the averages of the share of 
hydrocarbon in GDP ; the standard deviation of ; and the consumption to GDP ratio 
over the sample from 1991 to 2003. In the second panel, columns 5, 6 and 7 report the 
average projected hours worked, the value of the share of hydrocarbon, and the 
consumption – output ratio, yc / , respectively. In the third panel (columns 8, 9, 10 and 
11), we report the results of the first policy, policy I.  
 
In column 11, we quantify the policy of a 25.0 reduction, in US dollars. In addition, 
in the last three columns we report the results of the second policy.  
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Note the jump in the labor supply under policy I. The reduction in the hydrocarbon 
revenues is very small because we intended to show the welfare impact of a small 
change in policy. The reduction is 0.1 on average, which is about 1.4 billion US dollars. 
This reduction in hydrocarbon revenues is matched by an equal reduction in 
government spending to keep the budget constraint unchanged. We assume that the 
government can reshuffle the budget in any way it chooses such that it remains fixed. 8F
12
   
 
Table 5 reports the lifetime consumption equivalent of the two policies. Clearly, the 
welfare improvement, resulting from the diversification policy and measured in lifetime 
consumption equivalent, is positive and sizable. In the case of Oman, it is 14 per cent, 
followed by Qatar (10.8 per cent) and Kuwait (9.3 percent). The Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia gains relatively less from diversification because it is already the most 
diversified economy in the GCC. The share of manufacturing and agriculture in GDP 
are reasonably high. The World Bank Development Statistics reports Saudi Arabia's 
agriculture, manufacturing and services value added in the total GDP in 2008 to be 2.3, 
8 and 27.2 percent, respectively. Bahrain is the smallest oil-producer; its main source of 
income is not oil. Its welfare improvement from the diversification policy is equal to 
that of Saudi Arabia. In the UAE, the welfare improvement measured by lifetime 
consumption equivalent is 5 per cent, the third lowest. The share of agriculture, 
manufacturing and services value added in 2006 reported by the World Bank 
Development Statistics are 2, 12.25 and 39.11 percent, respectively. Qatar, Kuwait and 
Oman benefit the most from diversification. Qatar and Kuwait rely heavily on 
hydrocarbon revenues.
13
An introduction of a permanent 5 per cent VAT reduces 
welfare by around 4.6 per cent in terms of lifetime consumption equivalent. The 
positive change in the labor supply, resulting from the diversification policy, is greater 
in magnitude than the negative change resulting from the tax policy. One can only 
imagine a sizable welfare effect of a policy change larger than 0.25 standard deviations 
in hydrocarbon share in the economy. The point is clear: diversify and benefit. 
 
 
                                                 
12
 The Penn table 6.2 data are only available to the year 2003 for the GCC countries. 
13
 The Kuwaiti data are available from the same source for 2003 only. The shares are 0.46, 2.27 and 
48.5 percent, respectively. We do not have similar data for Qatar or Bahrain. 
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 5.2 Tax policy, labor supply and poverty reduction  
 
Here, we discuss the policy simulation pertinent to poverty reduction in the Arab 
countries. The question is about the efficacy of tax policy in reducing poverty. We ask 
whether a decrease in the tax rate, which increases the supply of hours, productivity 
and GDP, reduces poverty. And, if so, by how much and how long does it take?  
 
We choose Morocco as a case study for poverty for two reasons. Morocco's poverty 
level is high, 21 per cent of the population, and because we have some data on income 
distribution. The poverty data are based on the World Bank data found in POVNET for 
the year 2007 and the base year for real expenditures in 2005. For this reason, we use 
data for real consumption and output from the Penn Table 6.3, which has data up to 
2007 for Morocco and the base year is 2005.  
 
We solve the model over the period 1991-2006, and simulate the model stochastically 
with 10000 iterations over the period 2008 to 2040. In the baseline solution,   the 
effective marginal tax rate, is equal 0.39. We set   to 1.78, which is the average we 
used earlier, and the share of capital   equal to 0.55, which is also the average over the 
sample.  
 
Here, too, we guess that the capital stock's starting value is twice the size of real GDP 
in 1960. We assume the depreciation rate 0.05. Consumption is a random walk, with a 
standard normal error term of a zero mean and standard deviation equal to that of the 
sample average from 1991-2007. The value of the exogenous technical change A in the 
production function is the constant term, and calibrated such that the value of output in 
2008 is not far from the value at 2007 in order to ensure we have a sensible projection. 
The policy reduces the tax rate to 0.30 permanently.  
 
The simulated values of real consumption are used to compute poverty headcount. 
There are three parameters in the poverty function: mean real consumption 
expenditures, Gini coefficient and the poverty line. We fix the poverty line at 72 US 
dollars per household, per month, in PPP terms. The Gini coefficient is fixed.  
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The only parameter that changes is mean real consumption expenditure, which is 
updated over the simulation period. We report the results in table 6. Figure 1 plots the 
poverty reduction dynamics. 
 
Clearly, a tax reduction policy reduces poverty. As income level rises, and growth rate 
of real consumption rises, poverty declines by more than half in 2020, i.e., in 12 years. 
Everything else remains unchanged; poverty could be eliminated by 2050. One can 
clearly advocate more tax reduction than the one we assumed, and cut poverty even 
faster and by more.  
 
6. Conclusions  
 
The absence of data on hours worked makes policymaking very difficult. Our main 
contribution is to provide model-consistent estimates of hours worked, the Frisch 
elasticity of labor supply and labor productivity for the Arab countries, and compare 
them with the G7 countries. We use the work-leisure model of the labor supply, which 
has been tested extensively in the literature. This paper uses data from Arab countries 
to confirm the predictions of the model and add more supporting evidence to existing 
ones.  
 
We found that supply of labor of a number of Arab countries is just as elastic as labor 
supply in the G7 countries, and labor productivity is relatively lower than the G7 
countries. 
 
There are two types of Arab countries: non-oil-producing countries such as Egypt, 
Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia and major oil-producing countries such as the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members. Algeria is a major gas producer.  
 
Although the model explains the data of the first group of Arab countries well, where 
results are comparable to the G7, the second group of Arab countries (the GCC) is 
more interesting because there are no taxes in these countries. Without taxes, the 
model's performance and predictions are of limited value.  
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To ameliorate this deficiency, we introduce natural resource endowment effect in the 
work-leisure model. We define effective capital as the product of physical capital and 
natural resource capital. We found that natural resource endowment acts like a tax, 
i.e., reduce labor supply. 
 
Oil rich GCC countries rely heavily on their natural resources as income. The 
government budget swells during periods of high oil and gas prices, which beget 
rents. The opposite happens when hydrocarbon revenues decline and the budgets 
shrink. People work longer hours to compensate for the loss in rent, and smooth out 
consumption. We show that the data support such a theory over periods of actual high 
and low hydrocarbon revenues. The supply of labor could decline by up to 7 hours a 
week per person during periods of high oil revenues.   
 
In terms of the estimated Frisch elasticity, the Arab countries labor supplies are found 
to be very elastic, more so in the oil-producing countries. An elastic labor supply 
could imply less interventionist government policies. In addition, as populations’ age, 
transfer payments to current and future old generations need not be financed by 
increasing tax rates. It can open doors to social security policies that encourage 
savings (Prescott, 2004). Elastic labor supplies are also good for demand policies that 
aim at increasing employment and hours.  
 
We simulate the model for scenarios under a minimum number of additional 
assumptions. We demonstrate that a reduction in the effective marginal tax rate in the 
Arab countries can reduce poverty substantially, cut it in half in about 12 years in the 
case of Morocco. High taxes, even a 5 percent increase in the value added tax (VAT), 
in the oil-rich countries would reduce welfare in terms of the lifetime consumption 
equivalent. But, most importantly, the model suggests that welfare significantly 
increases as oil revenues decline in oil-producing countries. To change the natural 
resource curse to a blessing, it is recommended that the GCC countries diversify their 
income away from oil while they can. Our results indicate that a permanent reduction 
of hydrocarbon by the year 2020 could increase labor supply, real GDP and 
consumption, leading to a significant welfare improvement. 
23 
 
 References 
 
Akhand, H. and H. Liu (2002). Marginal Income Tax rates in the United States: A Non-
Parametric Approach, Journal of Monetary Economics 49, 383-404. 
 
Alogoskoufis, G.S. (1987). On Intertemporal Substitution and Aggregate Labor Supply, 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 95, No. 5, 938-960. 
 
Altonji, J. G. (1982). The Intertemporal Substitution Model of Labor Market Fluctuations: An 
Empirical Analysis, Review of Economic Studies, XLIX, 783-824. 
  
Auerbach, A. and L. J. Kotlikoff (1987). Dynamic Fiscal Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University press. 
 
Barro, R. J. (1979). On The Determination Public Debt, Journal of Political Economy 87, 
No.1, 940-971. 
 
Barro, R. J. and C. Sahasakul (1986). Average Marginal Tax Rates from Social Security and 
the Individual Income Tax, The Journal of Business, Vol.59, No.4 Part 1, 555-566. 
 
Barro, R. J. and C. Sahasakul (1983). Measuring the Average Marginal Tax Rate from the 
Individual Income Tax, The Journal of Business, Vol. 56, No.4, 419-452. 
  
Baxter, M. and R. King (1993). Fiscal Policy in General Equilibrium, American Economic 
Review 83 (June), 315-334. 
 
Boldrin, M., L. J. Christiano and J. D. M. Fisher (2001). Habit Persistence, Asset Returns, 
and the Business Cycle, American Economic Review 91 (March), 149-166. 
 
Card, D. (1991). Intertemporal Labor Supply: An Assessment, NBER, Cambridge, MA. 
Working Paper No. 3602. 
 
Christiano, L. J., and M. Eichenbaum, (1992). Current Real Business Cycle Theories and 
Aggregate Labor Market Fluctuations, American Economic Review, 82 (June), 430-450. 
 
Cole, H. L., and L.E. Ohanian (1999). The Great Depression in the United States from a 
Neoclassical Perspective, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 23 
(Winter), 2-24. 
 
Cole, H. L., and L.E. Ohanian (2002). The Great UK Depression: A Puzzle and a Possible 
Resolution, Review Of Economic Dynamics 5 (January), 19-44. 
 
Cooley, T., (ed.) (1995). Frontiers of Business Cycle Research, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Dutkowsky, D. H. and R. M. Dunsky (1996). Intertemporal Substitution, Money, and 
Aggregate Labor Supply, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 28, No. 2, 217-232. 
 
Feenburg D. R. and E. Coutts (1993). An Introduction to the TAXSIM Model, Journal of 
Policy Analysis and Management 12, 189-194.  
24 
 
  
Hall, R. (1978). Stochastic Implications of the Lifecycle – Permanent Income Hypothesis, 
Journal of Political Economy 86 (6), pp. 971-87. 
 
Hall, R.E (1980). Labor Supply and Aggregate Fluctuations, Carnegie-Rochester Conference 
Series, 12, 7-33. 
 
Hanson, G. D. (1985). Indivisible Labor and the Business Cycle, Journal of Monetary 
Economics 16 (November), 309-327. 
 
Heckman, J.J. (1993). What has been Learned About Labor Supply in the Past Twenty Years, 
American Economic Review, 83, 2 ABI, INFORM Global, 116. 
 
Heston, A., R. Summers and B. Aten (2006). Penn World Table Version 6.3, Center for 
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices,the University of Pennsylvania. 
 
Heston, A., R. Summers and B. Aten (2009). Penn World Table Version 6.3, Center for 
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices,the University of Pennsylvania. 
 
Kehoe, T. J. and E. C. Prescott (2002). Great Depressions of the 20
th
 Century, Review of 
Economic Dynamics 5 (January) 1-18.  
 
Kydland, F. E. and E. C. Prescott (1982). Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations, 
Econometrica 50 (November), 1345-1370. 
  
Lucas, R. Jr. and L. A. Rapping (1969). Real Wages, Employment and Inflation, Journal of 
Political Economy 77 (September-October), 721-754. 
 
Lucas, R. Jr.(1972). Expectations and the Neutrality of Money, Journal of Economic Theory 
4, 103-24. 
 
Makdisi, S., Z. Fattah, and I. Limam (2006). Explaining Growth in the Middle East, in: 
Contributions to Economic Analysis in MENA countries, Vol. 278, 31-60, Ch.2. 
 
Mankiw, N. G., J.J. Rotemberg and L. H. Summers (1985). Intertemporal Substitution in 
Macro Economics, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 225-251. 
 
McGrattan, E. R. and E. C. Prescott (2003). Taxes, Regulations, and the Value of US 
Corporartions: A General Equilibrium Analysis, Research Department Staff Report 309, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (August). 
 
McGrattan, E. R. and E. C. Prescott (2003). Average Debt and Equity Returns: Puzzling? 
American Economic Review 93 (May), 392-397. 
 
Nickell, S. (2003). Employment and Taxes, CESIFO Working Paper No.1109, (December). 
 
Noland, M. and H. Pack (2007). The Arab Economies in a Changing World, Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C. 
 
 
25 
 
  
Olovsson, C. (2009). Why Do Europeans Work So Little, International Economic Review, 
Vol. 50, No.1, 39-61. 
 
Prescott, E. C. (2004). Why Do Americans Work So Much More Than Europeans? Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, Vol. 28, No.1, 2-3.  
 
Ragan, K. S. (2006). Taxes, Transfers, and Time Use: Fiscal Policy in a Household 
Production Model, PhD. Thesis the University of Chicago. 
 
Rogerson, R. (2007). Taxation and Market Work: Is Scandinavia an Outlier? Economic 
Theory 32 (1), 59-85. 
 
Seater, J. J. (1982). Marginal Federal Personal and Cooperate Income Tax rates in the U.S., 
1909 – 1975, Journal of Monetary Economics 10, 361-381. 
 
Stephenson, E. F. (1998). Average marginal tax Rates Revisited, Journal of Monetary 
Economics 41, 389-409. 
  
Shimer, R. (2009). Convergence in Macroeconomics: The Labor Wedge, American Economic 
Journal Macroeconomics, Vol. 1 No. 1 (January), 280-297. 
 
Solow, R. and F. Y. Wan (1976). Extraction Costs in the Theory of Exhaustible Resources, 
The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 7, Issue 2, 359-370. 
 
Stiglitz, J. (1974). Growth with Exhaustible Natural Resources: Efficient and Optimal 
Growth Paths, Review of Economic Studies, 123-137. 
  
United Nations ( 2009). Development Challenges for the Arab Region: A Human 
Development Approach, U.N. 
  
26 
 
 Table 1: Actual and Predicted Labor Supply for the G7 and Arab non-oil Producing 
Countries 
)1/)(/()1(/)1(   ych  
Estimates of the Labor Supply for the G7 (2000-2008)
 
Country Actual h  Predicted
 
Difference     
 
yc /  
Canada 25.26 23.60   1.66 1.78 0.38 0.38 0.70 
France 20.08 22.73  -2.65 1.78 0.38 0.37 0.75 
Germany 19.33 21.88  -2.54 1.78 0.38 0.42 0.73 
Italy 21.09 22.45 -1.36 1.78 0.38 0.40 0.72 
Japan 26.98 28.40 -1.41 1.78 0.38 0.25 0.66 
UK 24.05 21.30   2.75 1.78 0.38 0.38 0.80 
US 26.06 23.71   2.35 1.78 0.38 0.30 0.79 
Average  G7 23.26 23.20   0.06 1.78 0.38 0.35 0.73 
 
Estimates of the Labor Supply for the Arab Countries (1991-2006) 
 Actual Predicted 
 
Frisch 
Elasticity 
      yc /  
Egypt NA 18.47 4.4 1.78 0.48 0.24 0.98 
Jordon NA 21.03 3.8 1.78 0.48 0.28 0.79 
Morocco NA 16.68 5.0 1.78 0.48 0.39 0.89 
Syria NA 26.10 2.8 1.78 0.48 0.19 0.67 
Tunisia  NA 17.11 4.8 1.78 0.48 0.35 0.92 
Average NA 19.87 4.1 1.78 0.48 0.28 0.85 
1.  Both  and  are the average values across G7 countries.  The individual values of  for G7 which 
minimizes the error are 1.6 (Canada), 2.2 (France), 2.1 (Germany), 1.7 (Italy), 2.1 (Japan), 1.6 (UK) and 1.6 
(USA) respectively.   Same average value of   is adopted for the Arab countries. Frisch elasticity is 1100/ h  
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 Table 2: Productivity Decomposition of Arab Non-Oil Producing Countries 
Relative to Average G7 – Sample 1991 to 2006 
 
Hours are based on a value of 78.1  
Country GDP per Person GDP per Hour 
Hours per 
Person 
Egypt 15.80 21.48 73.55 
Jordan 12.73 15.17 83.89 
Morocco 15.90 23.97 66.32 
Syria 6.21 5.94 104.6 
Tunisia 22.06 32.43 68.03 
G7 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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 Table 3: Labor Supply with Natural Resource Endowment for Oil Producing 
Countries )]1/)(/()1/[()1(ˆ   ych N  
( 29.1 ) 
Low Hydrocarbon Revenue Period High Hydrocarbon Revenue Period 
1991-1999 2000-2003 
 Nhˆ  Frisch 
elasticity 
  yc /      Nhˆ
 
Frisch 
elasticity 
  yc /      Difference 
in hours 
Algeria 20.4 3.9 0.34 0.73 0.47 0.19 13.2 6.6 0.38 0.61 0.55 0.27 -12.6 
              
Bahrain 25.8 2.9 0.05 0.73 0.49 0.19 18.8 4.3 0.05 0.72 0.53 0.26 -7.0 
Kuwait 12.8 6.8 0.05 0.81 0.49 0.36 7.2 12.8 0.05 0.71 0.53 0.40 -5.6 
Oman 21.7 3.6 0.05 0.83 0.49 0.22 9.8 9.2 0.05 0.73 0.53 0.37 -11.9 
Qatar 15.4 5.5 0.05 0.78 0.49 0.33 13.1 6.6 0.05 0.42 0.53 0.39 -2.30 
KSA 16.9 4.9 0.05 0.74 0.49 0.32 7.9 11.7 0.05 0.65 0.53 0.40 -9.0 
UAE 26.0 2.8 0.05 0.63 0.49 0.23 19.6 4.1 0.05 0.65 0.53 0.27 -6.4 
Average 19.8 4.43 0.05 0.75 0.49 0.29 12.72 8.14 0.05 0.65 0.53 0.35 -7.83 
)55.1(   
Low Hydrocarbon Revenue Period High Hydrocarbon Revenue Period 
1991-1999 2000-2003 
 Nhˆ  Frisch 
elasticity 
  yc /      Nhˆ
 
Frisch 
elasticity 
  yc /      Difference 
in hours 
Algeria 16.5 5.0 0.34 0.73 0.47 0.19 10.6 8.5 0.38 0.61 0.55 0.27 -5.9 
              
Bahrain 21.2 3.7 0.05 0.73 0.49 0.19 15.2 5.6 0.05 0.72 0.53 0.26 -6.0 
Kuwait 10.2 8.8 0.05 0.81 0.49 0.36 5.7 16.5 0.05 0.71 0.53 0.40 -4.5 
Oman 17.6 4.7 0.05 0.83 0.49 0.22 7.7 11.9 0.05 0.73 0.53 0.37 -9.9 
Qatar 12.4 7.1 0.05 0.78 0.49 0.33 10.5 8.6 0.05 0.42 0.53 0.39 -1.9 
KSA  13.6 6.4 0.05 0.74 0.49 0.32 6.2 15.2 0.05 0.65 0.53 0.40 -7.4 
UAE 21.4 3.7 0.05 0.63 0.49 0.33 15.9 5.3 0.05 0.65 0.53 0.27 -5.5 
Average 16.07 5.72 0.05 0.75 0.49 0.29 10.19 10.51 0.05 0.65 0.53 0.35 -5.0 
)2(   
Low Hydrocarbon Revenue Period High Hydrocarbon Revenue Period 
1991-1999 2000-2003 
 Nhˆ  Frisch 
elasticity 
  yc /      Nhˆ  Frisch 
elasticity 
  yc /      Difference 
in hours 
Algeria 13.3 6.5 0.34 0.73 0.47 0.19 8.40 10.9 0.38 0.61 0.55 0.27 -4.9 
              
Bahrain 17.2 4.8 0.05 0.73 0.49 0.19 12.20 7.2 0.05 0.72 0.53 0.26 -5.0 
Kuwait 8.1 11.4 0.05 0.81 0.49 0.36 4.50 21.4 0.05 0.71 0.53 0.40 -3.6 
Oman 14.2 6.0 0.05 0.83 0.49 0.22 6.10 15.4 0.05 0.73 0.53 0.37 -8.1 
Qatar 9.9 9.1 0.05 0.78 0.49 0.33 8.30 11.1 0.05 0.42 0.53 0.39 -1.6 
KSA 10.9 8.2 0.05 0.74 0.49 0.32 4.90 19.5 0.05 0.65 0.53 0.40 -6.0 
UAE 17.4 4.7 0.05 0.63 0.49 0.23 12.8 6.8 0.05 0.65 0.53 0.27 -4.4 
Average 12.96 7.38 0.05 0.75 0.49 0.29 8.11 13.56 0.05 0.65 0.53 0.35 -4.8 
 is the share of capital.  is the effective marginal tax rate; yc / is consumption to GDP ratio; Nhˆ is 
equilibrium hours-worked predicted by the model; and  is the share of hydrocarbon revenues in 
GDP. Frisch elasticity is 1100/ h . 
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 Table 4: Taxes, Natural Resources and Labor Supply Projections for GCC 
Average values 
Country Average Sample Data 
(1991-2003) 
Base Run  
(2004-2050) 
Policy I  
(2020 – 2050) 
Policy II  
(2004 – 2050) 
 
    yc /  
Nh    yc /  Nh    
25.0  
in 
million 
USD 
  Nh      
Bahrain 0.22 0.04 72.5 16.4 0.25 71.0 17.1 0.24 153.3 0.05 15.7 0.25 0.095 
Kuwait 0.38 0.07 83.7 11.4 0.35 64.3 12.5 0.33 1017.2 0.05 10.9 0.35 0.095 
Oman 0.26 0.07 79.5 7.4 0.39 73.3 8.8 0.37 839.8 0.05 7.0 0.39 0.095 
Qatar 0.37 0.07 65.7 13.4 0.36 39.2 14.8 0.35 351.7 0.05 12.8 0.36 0.095 
KSA 0.32 0.04 70.7 16.2 0.29 60.4 17.0 0.28 3812.9 0.05 15.6 0.29 0.095 
UAE 0.30 0.07 63.5 18.7 0.23 66.1 19.9 0.21 2187.5 0.05 18.0 0.23 0.095 
GCC 0.31 0.06 72.6 13.9 0.31 62.38 15.0 0.30 1393.7 0.05 13.6 0.31 0.095 
N
th is hours-worked (equation 10). 
  is the share of oil and gas (gas is converted into oil using the standard scale of 6.6). 
 is the standard deviation of the natural resource revenues in GDP. 
yc / is the consumption to GDP ratio. 
  is the tax rate. 
Consumption and  follow a random walk process over the simulation horizon from 2004 to 2050. 
Policy I is the diversification policy, where the GCC manages to diversify by 2020, and reduce the share of hydrocarbon by 0.25  . 
Policy II is the tax rate increases policy, where a 5% permanent increase in VAT (9.5 percent in the tax rate in equation 5). 
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 Table 5: Lifetime Consumption Equivalent 
Country Policy I Policy II 
Bahrain 3.87 - 4.79 
Kuwait 9.29 - 4.80 
Oman 13.99 - 3.77 
Qatar 10.88 - 4.78 
KSA 4.21 - 4.81 
UAE 5.07 - 4.82 
 
- Policy I is the diversification policy, where the share of hydrocarbon in GDP falls by 0.25 standard deviation from 2021 to 2050. 
- Policy II is an introduction of a 5 percent permanent increase in VAT, which amounts to a 9.5 percent increase in the tax rate. 
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 Table 6: Morocco's Poverty Reduction Policy Simulation 
 Hours GDP Per Capita 
dy /
 Income Multiplier 
s
tc  Poverty % 
2007 Baseline Policy Baseline Policy    21.59 
i
 
2008 15.99 17.97 5682.52 6014.69 -1.27 5.85 2.26 20.48 
2010 15.96 17.94 5905.58 6280.19 -1.15 6.34 2.58 18.27 
2015 15.97 17.95 6487.00 6967.58 -0.94 7.41 1.69 14.72 
2020 15.92 17.90 7076.94 7662.59 -0.81 8.28 1.20 10.50 
2025 15.93 17.91 7703.77 8395.41 -0.72 8.98 2.68 7.57 
2030 15.92 17.90 8356.12 9154.61 -0.66 9.56 1.51 5.61 
2035 15.93 17.91 9042.68 9949.86 -0.62 10.03 1.74 4.01 
2040 15.94 17.92 9767.29 10785.58 -0.58 10.43 1.37 2.92 
2045 15.93 17.91 10527.96 11659.88 -0.56 10.75 1.31 2.11 
2050 15.92 17.90 11328.41 12577.27 -0.53 11.02 1.46 1.54 
 
i Actual data 
-Data are in PPP 2005 base year.  Real PPP GDP. 
- dy /  is the tax multiplier, where an increase in the tax rate reduces income. 
- 100)/( bbs yyy   is the GDP multiplier, where the superscript s denotes simulation solution  
value and b denotes the baseline simulation value. 
-
s
tc  is the consumption growth after policy. 
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Appendix 1 – Data  
 
Average 2000-2008 Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK USA 
General government final consumption expenditure, %GDP 19.24 23.31 18.70 19.62 17.86 20.54 15.58 
Consumption of fixed capital, % GDP 13.01 13.00 14.89 15.28 20.62 11.26 11.85 
Household final consumption expenditure, % GDP 55.84 56.46 58.47 59.04 57.08 64.88 70.03 
Working Age Population to Total Population 0.69 0.63 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.67 
Employment to Age working population 0.72 0.65 0.67 0.58 0.75 0.71 0.72 
Taxes  individuals, % GDP 12.23 7.64 8.91 10.72 5.19 10.48 10.38 
Social Security Contributions, Employees % GDP 2.01 4.02 6.11 2.30 4.28 2.64 3.00 
Taxes on goods and services, % GDP 8.42 11.00 10.35 11.01 5.22 10.97 4.73 
Military Expenditure, % GDP 1.20 2.46 1.38 1.92 0.97 2.46 3.76 
c  0.16 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.09 0.19 0.07 
ss  0.04 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.05 
Capital Share 0.38 0.35 0.38 0.46 0.35 0.34 0.37 
inc  0.16 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.07 0.13 0.12 
h  0.28 0.23 0.30 0.28 0.18 0.26 0.25 
  0.38 0.37 0.42 0.40 0.25 0.38 0.30 
yc /  0.70 0.75 0.73 0.72 0.66 0.80 0.79 
GDP Per Person, GDP Less IT in PPP 2005 divided By 
Population aged 15-64 
42510.72 38698.09 37867.03 35733.27 40045.97 39364.55 57049.32 
 
   Source:OECD  
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 Data Appendix 2  
(average 1991-2006) 
Country 
Actual 
Weekly 
Worked 
Hours  
Capital 
Share 
Consumption 
Output Ratio, 
PWT 6.2 
(1991-
2003/04) 
Investment 
Ratio, PWT 
6.2 
(1991/03/04) 
Population 
(Millions) 
Labor force 
(Millions) 
Employment 
(Millions) 
Population 
Aged 15-64 % 
Total 
Population 
Employment to 
Population Aged 
15-64 
Algeria   0.51 0.69 12.67 29.79 10.46 8.01 60.14 0.44 
Bahrain   0.35 0.73 9.89 0.63 0.29 0.27 68.50 0.64 
Egypt   0.45 0.96 5.41 64.91 19.24 17.35 58.89 0.45 
Kuwait   0.57 0.84 10.67 2.05 1.08 1.09 70.99 0.74 
Jordan   0.36 0.77 14.39 4.60 1.23 1.21 68.35 0.38 
Morocco   0.56 0.90 11.52 27.76 9.56 8.55 60.67 0.51 
Oman   0.53 0.80 9.30 2.29 0.82 0.76 59.81 0.55 
Qatar   0.50 0.66 18.70 0.61 0.34 0.33 73.49 0.72 
KSA   0.51 0.71 9.96 20.06 6.64 6.34 58.67 0.54 
Syria   0.33 0.73 7.79 16.06 4.73 5.09 55.11 0.57 
Tunisia   0.24 0.92 13.35 9.33 3.09 2.71 62.78 0.46 
UAE   0.61 0.63 23.12 3.04 1.75 1.72 73.98 0.75 
Source ILO UN WDI-PWT PWT WDI WDI ILO WDI ILO 
 
 
country 
Employment 
to total 
population 
Ratio 
Oil and Gas 
Reserves, 
Billions 
Barrels of 
Equivalent Oil 
GDP Per 
Capita PPP 
PWT 6.2 
(1991/03/04) c
  ss  inc  ssinc      
 Share of 
Hydrocarbon 
Revenues 
Algeria 0.27 38.0 4826.0 0.18 0.05 0.10 0.21 0.33 0.23 
Bahrain 0.44 0.8 15562.4 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.22 
Egypt 0.27  3955.0 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.17 0.24   
Kuwait 0.53 107.7 21698.5 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.32 
Jordan 0.26   3835.6 0.16 0.04 0.08 0.16 0.28   
Morocco 0.31   3630.0 0.19 0.10 0.11 0.28 0.39   
Oman 0.33 9.7 13127.0 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.20 
Qatar 0.53 113.6 23284.6 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.35 
KSA 0.31 302.4 14086.7 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.25 
Syria 0.31  1799.0 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.20 0.19  
Tunisia 0.29  6296.2 0.22 0.05 0.08 0.16 0.31  
UAE 0.56 137.8 24455.5 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.26 
Source ILO BP PWT WDI, IFS SS 
WDI, 
IFS Computed Computed WDI, IFS 
 
ILO is the International Labor Organization 
BP is British Petroleum 
PWT is Penn World Table 6.3 
WDI is World Bank 
IFS is International Financial Stats, the IMF  
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 Appendix 3 
 
Sensitivity Analysis of the Effective Marginal Tax Rate Calculations 
 Lower Bound 
Estimate 
 Central Estimate  Upper Bound Estimate 
Country 
1  h   2  h   3  h   4  h  
Algeria 0.28 17.8  0.33 16.8  0.41 15.1  0.50 13.1 
Egypt 0.20 21.5  0.24 20.6  0.31 19.1  0.38 17.5 
Jordan 0.24 24.4  0.28 23.4  0.34 21.9  0.41 20.0 
Morocco 0.34 19.9  0.39 18.6  0.49 16.1  0.58 13.7 
Syria 0.12 30.6  0.19 28.8  0.32 25.4  0.44 21.9 
Tunisia 0.30 20.3  0.35 19.2  0.43 17.2  0.51 15.1 
Average 0.24 22.4  0.28 21.3  0.44 19.1  0.45 16.8 
1 corresponds to a tax rate with incssh t  1  
2 corresponds to a tax rate with incssh t  6.1   
3 corresponds to a tax rate with incssh t  6.2  
4 corresponds to a tax rate with incssh t  6.3   
See definitions of the social security tax and tax on income in the appendix. ss inc  
h )]1/(*)/()1/[()1(   yc are hours-worked using predicting factors 48.0 ;  
average Arab countries yc / and 55.1  
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